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THE nation is relatively free from widespread strikes, but it is
clear that explosive forces in the field of industrial relations are
only temporarily held in leash; organized power and the disposi-
tion to use power in the resolution of labor disputes are still present and
may at any moment precipitate disruptions in basic industries on a scale
and for a duration that will burden public welfare to an intolerable degree.
Events of the past year have forced a reluctant public to realize that ac-
tion must be taken to protect the economic life of the community from
both small and large groups of highly organized workers. A notably blind
zeal on the part of government to give operative meaning to that journal-
istic jargon, "equalization of bargaining power," has created a situation
in which organized workers not only have the power to shut off essential
supplies and services, but also the readiness to use that power over small
issues. There is no balance here. No business organizations have ever
existed which would have dared act in a comparable manner respecting
essential industries and services. Clearly something drastic must be done
to protect the public interest from strikes. The problem is not limited to
the directly essential industries, but includes industry-wide strikes gener-
ally, since practically every type of industry or business is essential when
considered on a national scale.
The immediate public concern about trade unions derives from the
threat, or certainty, of devastating strikes. In consequence, most sugges-
tions for remedial action are intended to limit either the right or power of
unions to strike. Potential strikes are of the utmost importance and action
must be taken to hold them within tolerable limits. The current preoccu-
pation with strikes reflects, however, an inaccurate and incomplete anal-
ysis of the problem, and consequently most of the remedies suggested
would be either ineffective or harmful.
The right to strike is not an absolute right but it is a fundamental con-
dition of human freedom; any interference should be held to the absolute
minimum required by the public interest. The power to strike, however, is
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a different matter. Except under the most extreme circumstances the
right of workers, either as individuals or as groups, to quit work should be
held inviolate-this should apply to government workers equally with
workers in private employment. The power to strike, however, is meas-
ured by the ability of a union to exercise harmful and costly coercion.
Union power derives fundamentally from and is proportional to potential
or demonstrated ability to exercise harmful coercion. Privately, no candid
labor leaders would deny this statement; publicly, they demonstrate its
validity by their unqualified opposition to any proposed restraints.
This observation that power to exercise coercion, both economic and
personal, is the essence of unionism is not per se a condemnation of coer-
cive power and its exercise by voluntary groups. Without power to coerce,
unions would at best be a species of conference or public relations club; at
worst they would not even be recognized or listened to at all by managers
or administrators. Unions to be unions must have power and if necessary
be willing and able to use it in a manner to command attention and full
consideration of all reasonable interests that lie within the control or dis-
cretion of management.
Currently, however, unions simply have too much coercive power. They
have more power than they need to achieve all the legitimate, construc-
tive actions for which unions are an appropriate agency, and too much
coercive power for the safety of the public interest. It is entirely fatuous to
assume that given power they will not use it. The problem of a satisfac-
tory public policy respecting trade unionism lies, then, in this matter of
delegation of the coercive power of government to unions in the minimum
measure required for effective union action. If power were held to the
minimum necessary to achieve all the constructive actions of which
unions are capable, there would be little need of any further supervi-
sion over the manner in which unions administer their internal affairs
and apply their coercive power. Only in the case of industries or ser-
vices that must of necessity be continued in operation would it be ne-
cessary to go further to impose some restraint on the right to strike.
II
In a succession of statutes beginning with the Act of i888, Congress
has fumbled toward a national policy of facilitating, promoting, and pro-
tecting the organization and collective action of workers through officially
approved types of trade unions. More recently the federal courts have
changed the legal status of unions in a revolutionary way, both by sup-
porting the legislative program of -Congress and, except for the more fla-
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grant types and modes of tortious acts, freeing unions from practically all
restraints imposed by previous legislation and court decisions.
Much criticism and abuse has been heaped upon Congress, the federal
courts, and administrative agencies for the undoing of the old order.
Doubtless some of this criticism is well founded, but for the most part the
difficulty does not lie there. The old order was essentially inconsistent; it
accorded to workers practically complete freedom to organize in any
scope and manner they pleased, and to engage in collective action on mat-
ters of interest to workers, but hedged this freedom with restrictions and
restraints to a degree that made it practically ineffective except for stra-
tegically situated groups of workers. Unions of such strategically situ-
ated groups of workers in many cases preyed almost at will on the
public whereas the advantages of unionism were in effect denied to the
great mass of workers. Few tears need be shed for the passing of that
type of old order.
The difficulty stems primarily from the fact that the new order insti-
tuted by Congress and the federal courts is both incomplete and based
upon unsound assumptions of fact. It reflects failure to take into account
certain basic economic facts, and gross misunderstanding of the nature
of unions and so-called collective bargaining, and the limited aspects of
the industrial relations problem for which unions are an appropriate
agency. In consequence, unions have been aided by government to ac-
quire and use power in ways and in degrees that are not consistent with
the public interest. In developing this program it is only fair, however,
to observe that Congress and the federal courts were supported by a
strong public opinion. A more adequate public understanding is, then,
basic to the development of a better considered policy respecting trade
unionism.
Prior to 1930 government policy respecting unions in general tolerated
but did not facilitate union organization. The policy, as reflected in federal
court decisions, was concerned largely with limiting the use of coercive
power by unions to extend organization and to gain union advantage
through restraint of trade. This line of policy on the part of both Con-
gress and the federal courts was entirely'consistent with popular opinion
and attitudes, which in turn were basically a reflection of the trend of
economic and cultural developments during the decades i9oo to 1930.
Except for minor set-backs this was a period of sustained high-level em-
ployment, rapidly rising real income, continued reduction in hours of
work, and improvement of working conditions; a golden age literally, in
which opportunity for the mass of workers expanded rapidly and with
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reasonable continuity. Reacting to these trends in conditions it was the
popular opinion that, except for women, children, and other sub-standard
groups, the proper role of government was that of preventing or limiting
restrictive or inflationary pressures through coercive action by organized
workers. In retrospect, the fact that restrictive and limiting action was
not taken in equal measure against business combination is understandable
but regrettable; the era was simply too progressively prosperous to justify
extensive tinkering with the entreprenurial agencies to which credit for
the favorable trends was popularly accorded; also the times were not
propitious for the development of those would-be godlike creatures
which more recently have appeared in distressing numbers-the planners.
Prior to 1930 the railroads were the single exception to the trend of gov-
ernment policy as outlined above. In this industry Congress not only
passed special laws to mitigate or prevent strikes, but also added its
coercive power to facilitate peaceful organization, and to promote collec-
tive action on a national basis. This special government labor program on
the railroads did not represent any basic difference in economic or political
philosophy respecting industrial relations or the role of the government
therein, but was merely a consequence of following counsels of expediency
in dealing with developments in this basic public utility. Industry-wide
union organization and industry-wide bargaining were established by the
Federal Railroad Administrator (an arch conservative) as an expedient
method of handling labor relations during the period of World War I rail-
road operation by the government. Attempts by carrier managements,
after resuming control in 1920, to cast off the yoke imposed by govern-
ment culminated in the railroad strikes of 1922. The Railroad Labor Act
of 1926 which marks a different departure in government policy toward
unionism, and which provided in part a precedent and pattern for the
government policy that developed after 1930, was scarcely more than a
ratification by Congress of an agreement worked out by the unions and
the carriers. The act facilitated and strengthened union organization but
its principal features were provisions to facilitate peaceful settlement of
disputes in accordance with specified methods and standards. Although the
Railroad Labor Act of 1926 served as a pattern for Congressional policy
after 1930, the pattern was followed only with respect to facilitating or-
ganization; all elements of the act designed to prevent strikes and effect
settlement of disputes on the basis of prescribed methods and criteria were
omitted. Indeed, a considerable part of current proposals for changing
government labor policy for employment not covered by the act would do
no more than add the omitted elements of the act.
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The revolutionary change in federal labor policy after 193o, as reflected
in both legislation and court decisions, was determined by the fact of
widespread, persistent unemployment and the resultant frustration that
so effectively paralyzed all groups of economic functionaries-owners,
managers, workers, and consumers. Government took over with the New
Deal, timidly at first under President Hoover, but with a torchlight pa-
rade under President Roosevelt. Like practically every other element of
the New Deal program, the several elements of the labor policy estab-
lished by legislation were given a 'two-sided justification-one side
humanitarianism, the other inflation or reflation. It would be futile to
speculate as to which of these was the basic objective. Perhaps most peo-
ple, along with President Roosevelt, found no difficulty in convincing
themselves that these were only two sides of the same thing; certainly the
program was highly popular. In time, also, the Supreme Court became a
New Deal Court-that is, an inflationist court, so that it quite naturally
followed the inflationist line in decisions dealing with trade unionism.
Inflation is not an adequate characterization of the radical change in
economic theory that gained widespread popular acceptance and became
the general basis of government policy in the 193o's, and which in fact
continues to date to be the popular economic doctrine, and the basis of
both government and union economic policy. It would not appear neces-
sary here (even if space permitted) either to explain fully or to argue the
merits of an economic theory on the basis of which the federal government
during the I93o's did in fact take over a major share of responsibility for
the national income and its distribution. It suffices here to note that prac-
tically every New Deal measure was designed and administered to inject
new money into circulation and thus effect inflation and an expansion of
the flow of money income. Whatever other objectives the government
may have had in mind, the major argument for its policy toward trade
unionism was to make unions effective inflationary agencies. This was
done by Congress, the federal courts, and administrative agencies dealing
with labor matters by: i) facilitating union organization-this by tying
the hands of the employer by unfair labor practice rules; failure to re-
strain unions from coercing non-union employees; abolition of "yellow
dog" contracts; practically freeing unions from injunctive restraints; and
sanctioning a free use of coercive action through strikes, boycotts, and
picketing; 2) by increasing the ability of unions to exact higher stand-
ards of wages, hours, and other working conditions-this by the bare ma-
jority rule; compelling employers to bargain with certified unions subject
to an administrative test of good faith; throwing the weight of govern-
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ment mediation and arbitration in favor of higher labor standards; im-
posing union security and check-off rules; and by largely eliminating in-
dependent unions. While putting this program into effect Congress did
not impose any of the restricting, limiting, or mitigating elements of the
Railway Labor Act of 1926. Such limitations would have been inconsistent
with the objective of making unions effective agencies for spreading un-
employment, raising wages and other labor standards and thus promoting
inflation. The New Deal Supreme Court came right along by supporting
the new government legislative and administrative program, and by elimi-
nating most of the restrictions previously imposed by court interpreta-
tions of the Sherman Act.
The war period, with one exception, continued and increased the trend
of government action established in the 1930's; the exception was the
dragging anchor placed on wages. But this dragging anchor did not pre-
vent an increase of about 20 per cent in the "stabilized" purchasing
power of the average hourly wage-this over and above the so-called
"fringe issue" gains. In anticipation of the end of the war the federal gov-
ernment picked up just where it had left off to use unions and so-called
collective bargaining to effect inflation and thus avoid deflation. This
inflationary policy continues; prices are still rising and the next round of
union demands for inflationary wage increases with potentially devastat-
ing strike threats is under way.
III
So here we are with a government policy respecting unions that is an
integral part of the highly specialized type of planned economy that was
created to deal with the depression of the 1930's; a labor policy that has
only incidental, if any, constructive relation to industrial relations. Gov-
ernment is still engaged in promoting union organization, and strengthen-
ing and facilitating coercive action by unions with continued inflationary
consequences. The inevitable consequence of a continuation of this pro-
gram will be a disastrous depression following the collapse of the present
boom. The current labor policy does not have any place whatsoever in a
free enterprise economy, and neither does it make sense in any planned
economy. No matter which type of economy we may choose, the current
policy respecting trade unionism is due for such a drastic revision that
precious little of it will be left. A mere patching process will not do. The
problem is not merely a matter of devastating strikes; it goes to the very
heart of the problem of developing and operating a satisfactory economic
and political order.
Suppose the nation were to eschew free enterprise in favor of a planned
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economy-planned to maintain economic stability at a high level of em-
ployment. Government would be obliged to take control of the labor
market in even a more rigorous manner than prevailed during war-
time-this for the simple reason that we could not have stability and
at the same time permit unions to continue disruptive, distortional, and
inflationary action. Workers would of necessity be subject to some sub-
stantial degree of control respecting place of work, choice of occupation,
allocation of work, wages, hours, and other working conditions. Collec-
tive bargaining as anything more than a mild expression of opinion about
worker interests would all but disappear; unions would become a labor
front, and this would be true even if politically organized workers were in
control of the planning. Doubting readers and those who desire a fuller
statement of the role of unions in a planned economy are referred to Sir
William Beveridge, the dean of British planners.,
Practically everybody, however, eschews a planned economy and
swears fealty to the objective of restoring and maintaining a free enter-
prise system. It is certain that most people have an entirely inadequate
understanding of the elements and requirements of a free enterprise sys-
tem, but nevertheless their expression of faith should be taken seriously.
For a brief, but competent, popular statement of the essentials of a free
enterprise system, and the conditions necessary for its preservation and
effective operation, the reader is referred to a pamphlet by Henry C.
Simons.2 As a basis for outlining an appropriate government policy re-
specting trade unionism, it suffices here to point out that in a free enter-
prise system all the basic economic processes are controlled through the
automatic processes of free markets for services as well as commodities.
It is not enough, however, that markets be free from domination or re-
striction-they must also be technically efficient. The role of government
in such a system is limited largely to facilitating effective markets and
to establishing and policing rules necessary to promote and protect free
and fair competition among buyers and sellers of goods and services.
There is a place for collective action by unions in a free enterprise
system, but the role is decidedly limited. The role is, moreover, decidedly
more limited than that accorded unions in the period prior to 1930;
merely to go back to the policy of that era would not be adequate. In those
days few industries or occupations were highly organized so that the in-
terferences permitted the unions in getting special privileges for their
members did not impose unbearable burdens on the remainder of the
' Beveridge, Full Employment in a Free Society 198-201 (1945).
2 Simons, A Positive Program for Laissez Faire (1934).
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-economy. Comparable and proportional conduct by the present mass or-
ganization of workers would make impossible the effective operation of a
free contract system. We must start all over to devise a workable govern-
ment policy.
IV
The outline of a proper government policy respecting trade unionism is
most simply and dearly approached by defining the essential construc-
tive service of a union. The essential task or service of a union is to deal
directly with managers for fair treatment on any matters of direct interest
to all the employees who may be subject to the direction and control of a
given management. Whatever else may be involved, employees are di-
rectly interested in rates of pay, continuity of employment, allocation of
work, job standards, personal treatment, hours, etc. Employees need an
organization not only capable of giving effective expression to their in-
terests in such matters but also, if necessary, capable of forcing manage-
ment to give full and fair consideration. Given effective labor markets,
"full and fair consideration" is not easy but is practicable of determina-
tion; fair standards are merely the equivalent of those prevailing in the
local labor market area, and good personal treatment is to be treated like
a self-respecting human being. The place for unions thus outlined is a nec-
essary and important role, but that is the limit of their role in a free enter-
prise system. To go further would be to grant unions the right to exercise
coercive power to gain special privileges for their members. Contrary to
popular notion unions seldom bargain against management-they bargain
through management for special privileges ultimately at the expense of
non-members. As a long run matter union gains are never made at the
expense of competitive profits; and only under highly specialized and
limited circumstances are union gains made at the expense of monopoly
profits; unions in most cases merely add more monopoly burdens.
The central objective of government policy should be to encourage, pro-
mote, and protect collective action between employees and management,
but to confine the economic impacts of such collective action to the in-
dividual operating company. With respect to the great mass of unions,
this objective can be attained by a few rather simple changes in present
law. Amend the Wagner Act to: i) with exceptions noted below, limit
the permissible bargaining unit to all the employees, exclusive of manage-
ment, of a plant or establishment, or, if desired by the workers, a single
operating company; one plant, establishment or company unit to have
only one union; 2) with exceptions noted below, a union to be limited to
the employees of the bargaining units defined in i) above. Only if judged
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imperative to make possible effective union organization and bargaining
in establishments having a small number of employees, and in types of
business such as building construction in which employment is charac-
teristically of short duration, the National Labor Relations Board would
be empowered to permit and promote local labor market area unions and
bargaining units. Only within the limits as defined above would the or-
ganization activities of unions be permissible. Within these limits, how-
ever, organization by workers should be effectively protected and facili-
tated by government.
Legislation should be enacted to prevent the management unit unions
and area unions as established above from combining or conspiring with
one another. In the case of the area unions, legislation should be enacted
to provide government supervision of agreements to make certain that
standards agreed to were not substantially in excess of those prevailing in
the local market area for comparable grades and types of service, and to
prevent monopolistic action respecting jobs, materials, processes, and
prices.
Public utilities, railroads, and other services, for which continuity of
operation is essential, present a problem not adequately provided for in
the preceding proposals. Union organization and bargaining should, as
in other cases, be on an establishment or company basis; this for the
simple objective of restoring as much as possible competitive determina-
tion of labor standards. In such industries, however, the public interest
cannot endure the burden of strikes even if limited to a company or es-
tablishment basis. In all such cases, which should be held by administra-
tive judgment to the absolute minimum, compulsory arbitration should
be established by law, as a procedure of last resort. This step should follow
use of procedures of adjustment and adjudication of disputes on the basis
of standards designed to facilitate prompt adjustment of disputes and to
keep employment in such industries relatively attractive. The present
procedures for dealing with labor on the railroads is inaedquate, and short
of questionable applications of wartime legislation, we have no provision
for government control of strikes in public utility and other essential in-
dustries. Government control of union action on the railroads is inade-
quate because: i) it does not provide sufficient protection against strikes;
2) it has fostered and preserved an arbitrarily determined wage structure
that maintains inequitable treatment as among railroad workers, and a
wage structure out of line (both above and below) with competitive stand-
ards; 3) working rules are inequitable as among railroad workers and un-
duly burden railroad operation; 4) adjustment procedures are too slow
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and cumbersome; 5) responsibility for labor standards and rate making
are not sufficiently joined. These weaknesses of the present regulation
of union action on the railroads should be taken into account in designing
a regulatory policy for union action in essential industries.
The program outlined above would largely eliminate craft and occupa-
tional unions-but they are largely obsolete anyway. It also would de-
"stroy the present great national unions which frequently encompass na-
tionally an entire occupation or industry, and in many cases spread over
many industries of divers sorts; but there is no possible excuse for such
unions in a free enterprise system. The question will be raised if such
drastic change in the status of unions is politically feasible; the answer is
that unions will fight with all their power against even the mildest re-
striction; if merely scotched they will sustain the fight. Irrespective of
union opposition, the changes suggested are necessary to the operation of
free enterprise, and if public opinion really supports free enterprise, the
program is politically feasible.
Would unions limited to a company or area basis be able to effect stable
organizations and have sufficient coercive power to command the con-
sideration of management? The currently large number of effective inde-
pendent unions on a company basis appears to be a positive answer to this
question. Nothing in the proposed policy would prevent unions from em-
ploying specialists or, short of combination and conspiracy, participating
in a national secretariat or trade association for mutual aid.
The positive arguments for the policy as outlined are: i) it would re-
duce union power to proper proportions without impairing the right to
organize, or, except for essential industries, the right to strike; 2) it would
reduce to workable limits the monopolistic and restrictive powers of un-
ions; 3) whatever offset unions provide for employer monopoly would be
retained by company bargaining; 4) collective bargaining, except in the
case of area and utility unions, would be held automatically to marginal
productivity limits by the simple fact that if labor costs were raised above
competitive levels in the industry, unemployment would be imposed on
the union members; 5) unions would be able to compel employers to
provide a fair deal but no more.
This program would be a bitter pill for the present unions; their alter-
native is to be warped into a labor front in a planned economy and lose
all essential freedom of action along with the rest of us. Halfway meas-
ures would be no measures.
